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Community Property with Right of
Survivorship
ROBERT L. MENNELL*
In California, property cannot be both joint tenancy and com-
munity property. This article examines the California rule and
concludes that the rule should be reversed. The author proposes
the creation of a voluntary addition to the community ownership
of the right of survivorship, as is done in Idaho, Nevada, and
Washington.
INTRODUCTION
In California and seven other statesl, property acquired oner-
ously during marriage by a married couple is generally 2 commu-
nity property, unless the couple agrees otherwise. The
community property system is derived from the civil law system. 3
One form of holding title at common law is joint tenancy4 with
t Copyright 1983 Robert L. Mennell.
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1. The other states having community property systems are: Arizona, Idaho,
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
2. R. MENNELL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 3 (1982). This broad
generalization obviously requires substantial modification for complete accuracy.
For example, Louisiana and Texas have-until recently--completely or partly lim-
ited the right of married persons to change the character of their property from
community to separate or vice versa. Id. at 31, 32-33.
3. The civil law system is generally rejected in favor of the common law sys-
tem in the United States; but an area in which the civil law system is incorporated
into the California common law system includes the method of computing kinship.
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 253 (West 1956). Compare the common law method ex-
plained in 2 W. BLAcKsToNE, COmENTAIEs** 206-07 (1883).
4. Although loose usage may refer to other forms of joint ownership, the term
'Joint tenancy" in California refers to that joint tenancy which contains a right of
survivorship.
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right of survivorship. 5 The right of survivorship is an "incident of'
the joint tenancy. Laypersons often believe that joint tenancy is a
more convenient or advantageous method of holding title because
of its right of survivorship. Many married persons desire to hold
their property as joint tenants in order to avoid probate.
In California, case law6 has established the rule that property
cannot be both joint tenancy and community property. Layper-
sons have difficulty understanding this rule. This rule is circum-
vented by statute for some assets.7 However, only Idaho, Nevada
and Washington have been bold enough to enact statutes author-
izing the addition of the desired survivorship characteristic to
community property in general.
This article accepts the view that property could and should si-
multaneously be community and possess the incident of the right
of survivorship. It suggests that cases establishing the contrary
rule should be reexamined and reversed. As an alternative for ju-
dicial removal of ancient obstacles, this article suggests legislative
remedies, taken from existing models both within and outside of
California.
WHY CALIFoRIANs DESIRE A RIGHr OF SURVIVORSHIP
The popularity of joint tenancy has long been recognized by the
courts 8 and writers.9 A recent studyo indicates that joint tenancy
5. Pre6ision and Texas usage seem to require that the right of survivorship
be spelled out in order to avoid confusion between a joint tenancy and other forms
of concurrent ownership, such as tenancy in common, which could loosely be
called "joint." J. MENNELL, supra note 2, at 118-40; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46
(Vernon 1980). If one wishes to astonish friends with erudition, they may refer to
the right of survivorship by its Latin name, jus accrescendi.
6. See, e.g., Jacquemart v. Jacquemart, 142 Cal. App. 2d 794, 299 P.2d 281
(1956); Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal. App. 2d 597, 272 P.2d 566 (1954); Perdicalis
v. Perdicalis, 92 Cal. App. 2d 274, 206 P.2d 650 (1949); Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d
754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944); Estate of Taitmeyer, 60 Cal. App. 2d 699, 141 P.2d 504
(1943); Estate of Watkins, 16 Cal. App. 2d 793, 104 P.2d 389 (1940), rev'd on other
grounds, 16 Cal. 2d 793, 108 P.2d 417 (1941); Gwin v. Camp, 25 Cal. App. 2d 10, 76
P.2d 160 (1938); Estate of McCoin, 9 Cal. App. 2d 480, 50 P.2d 114 (1935); Estate of
Putnam, 131 Cal. App. 21, 20 P.2d 783, affd, 219 Cal. 608, 28 P.2d 27 (1933); Estate of
Fingland, 129 Cal. App. 395, 18 P.2d 747 (1933); Young v. Young, 126 Cal. App. 306,
14 P.2d 580 (1932); Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 13 P.2d 513 (1932); Siberell v.
Siberell, 214 CaL 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932); Estate of Gurnsey, 177 Cal. 211, 170 P. 402
(1918).
7. CAL. Civ. CODE § 704 (West 1982); see infra notes 60-66 and 88-89 and ac-
companying text.
8. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 126 Cal. App. 306, 308-09, 14 P.2d 580, 581 (1932).
9. See e.g., Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STA. L.
REV. 87, 88 n.4 (1961); Marshall, Joint Tenancy, Taxwise and Otherwise, 40 CALIF.
L. REV. 501, n.2 (1952); Comment, Community Property: Status of Property Con-
veyed to Husband and Wife as Co-Grantees, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 546 (1932).
10. The author recognizes, with gratitude, the efforts of Cheryl L. Edwards, a
second-year student at the University of San Diego School of Law, for a statistical
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is the form preferred by spouses taking title to realty: in a survey
of 900 consecutive deeds to grantees described as husband and
wife," 163 deeds (slightly over 18%) specified community prop-
erty, while the remaining 737 (almost 82%) named the spouses as
joint tenants.
Why is joint tenancy preferred over community property? Con-
trasting the present' 2 legal consequences of joint tenancy against
those of community property probably provides the answer-. Al-
though a joint tenancy is more difficult to create in California,'
3
study of 900 consecutive deeds to husbands and wives recorded between Septem-
ber 22, 1982, and October 5, 1982, in the office of the County Recorder of San Diego
County, California.
11. The study disregarded deeds to married and unmarried persons which did
not show the names of both husband and wife, and also disregarded instruments
other than deeds. Between 4,000 and 5,000 deeds were recorded in that office each
month of 1982. Although no recent similar survey or statistical report is available
from title companies or recorders' offices, there is no reason to believe that the
surveyed group of deeds is atypical.
12. In addition to the present distinctions between community property and
joint tenancy, a number of historic differences have been eliminated by the Cali-
fornia legislature:
(1) Intestate distribution of husband's half of community property: prior
to 1923, the husband's half of community property passed by intestacy to
others instead of to his widow. Joint tenancy property, of course, be-
longed to the surviving joint tenant. After 1923, the widow was thWe sole
intestate taker of the husband's half of community property. See infra
note 36 and accompanying text;
(2) Intestate distribution of property received from a predeceased
spouse: the intestate distribution was treated differently when the prop-
erty received by the intestate widow or widower from the predeceased
spouse was community property, as opposed to joint tenancy property.
See Estate of Kessler, 217 Cal. 32, 17 P.2d 117 (1932); Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52
Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (1942). That distinction was eliminated by
legislation, 1939 CAL. STAT. c. 1065, § 1, which is reflected in the present
wording of CAL. PRoB. CODE § 229 (West Supp. 1982). See infra note 60;
(3) Inheritance Tax: McDougald v. Boyd, 172 Cal. 753, 159 P. 168 (1916)
and Estate of Gurnsey, 177 Cal. 211, 170 P. 402 (1918), both held that the
then existing inheritance tax statutes did not reach joint tenancies created
before their effective date, while community property of the same dece-
dent was reached by the statutes. Subsequent tax statutes eliminated
this distinction;
(4) Divorce: see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
See also Miller, Joint Tenancy as Related to Community Property, 19 CAL. ST. B.J.
61, 63-64 (1944). A couple would be unlikely to prefer joint tenancy over commu-
nity property in order to obtain any of these advantages. The gradual elimination
of the distinctions shows a legislative tendency to blend joint tenancy and commu-
nity property attributes.
13. C. Crv. CODE § 683 (West Supp. 1982) requires an express declaration in
the conveyance or transfer that the estate created is joint tenancy. That statute
also provides exceptions to the usual rule that the "four unities" of interest, title,
can be terminated unilaterally,14 and can cause a different income
tax basis15 for the survivor, it possesses the right of survivorship.
Of these four differences, the first three usually work to the disad-
vantage of one or more of the joint tenants. Therefore, it appears
that the reason for the popularity of joint tenancy is the right of
survivorship. The right of survivorship allows the surviving joint
tenant to avoid probate administration, including creditors'
claims, and permits bank and transfer agents to transfer title with
a minimum of risk.
Avoiding Probate
The "evils" of probate include 1. loss of privacy, 2. delay in
clearing title and the resulting suspension of the power to change
investments, and 3. the cost.
Privacy is sacrificed for the protection offered by judicial super-
vision to the extent that any court proceeding is used, whether for
a full probate administration,16 summary administration of com-
munity property 7 or to clear title to joint tenancy property. 8
Delay is caused by litigation, determination of death taxes, and
the required procedures. Litigation delay is both frequent and
unpredictable. The joint tenancy form does not guarantee exemp-
tion from litigation. Probate procedures do, however, present a
convenient forum for litigation. The delay involved in determina-
tion and payment of death taxes due is approximately the same
regardless of the form of title; the delay in clearing title is gener-
ally greater in administering a probate of community property
than in terminating a joint tenancy.
Costs of administering a decedent's estate include the following
items which are presented in order of decreasing amounts:
i. Attorneys' fees and executors' commissions (if not
waived):19 in a joint tenancy termination, an executor is
time, and possession are required. See Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003
(1932).
14. Community property can generally be terminated unilaterally by one
spouse donating his or her interest to the other spouse. The unilateral termina-
tion of joint tenancy differs because the former joint tenants retain an aliquot por-
tion of the property. Further, the termination of a joint tenancy by one joint
tenant does not require the consent, or even the knowledge, of the other joint ten-
ant. See infra note 32.
15. See Comment, Joint Tenancy v. Community Property in California: Possi-
ble Effect Upon Federal Income Tax Basis, 3 U.CJ.A L REv. 636, 638-41 (1956).
16. See CAL PROB. CODE §§ 300-1106 (West Supp. 1982).
17. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 202, 650-657 (West Supp. 1982).
18. See CAr PROB. CODE §§ 1170-1175 (West 1981).
19. Attorneys' fees and executors' commissions are fixed by CAIL PROB. CODE
§§ 900-904, 910 (West 1981) in California for probate estates, but the authorization
by CAL PROB. CODE § 903 (West 1981) of fees or commissions for extraordinary
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neither necessary nor required. An attorney is often neces-
sary, although not required. The fees for the attorney are not
regulated by statute. The attorney is able to charge whatever
is deemed appropriate, limited only by the very loose test of
California Rule of Professional Conduct 2-107.20
ii. Death taxes (which is the largest cost item in estates
which exceed one million dollars in value): neither commu-
nity property nor joint tenancy presently has an advantage
over the other in this category.
iii. Bond (if not waived): if a bond is required, substantial
cost is usually involved if the value of the estate's personal
property is large. Bonding is not required in joint tenancy
terminations.
iv. Miscellaneous court costs, such as filing and certifica-
tion fees: these tend to be relatively small amounts. The
costs of joint tenancy termination include modest recording
fees and may be close to the amount of a probate proceeding
if a judicial joint tenancy termination procedure is used. Cer-
tain other costs, such as income taxes, appraisals, litigation
expenses, and costs of maintaining or selling property, vary
too greatly from estate to estate to permit generalization.
In summary, probate administration tends to cost more because
of personal representatives' commissions, bonds, and miscellane-
ous court costs. Usually attorneys' fees are higher for probate ad-
ministration than for terminating a joint tenancy.
Clearing of title after the death of a joint tenant is relatively
simple. The surviving joint tenant 2l absorbs the former interest
services (which have become very ordinary in estates) increases the total fees by
an unpredictable amount.
20. CAL. RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
Rule 2-107 (West 1981) provides:
(A) A member of the State Bar shall not enter into an agreement for,
charge or collect an illegal or unconscionable fee.
(B) A fee is unconscionable when it is so exorbitant and wholly dispro-
portionate to the services performed as to shock the conscience of lawyers
of ordinary prudence practicing in the same community...
It is uncertain which is the more difficult task-to find a "lawyer of ordinary pru-
dence" or to shock his or her conscience. Suffice it to say that disciplinary pro-
ceedings for excessive fees are rare.
21. There may be two or more joint tenants. If there are three or more joint
tenants, the surviving joint tenants acquire the interest of each successively dying
joint tenant until either there is only one survivor or the joint tenancy with its
right of survivorship is destroyed. Because joint tenancy between two members of
of the deceased joint tenant. The absorbtion is more than imme-
diate; it is retroactive. The entire interest of the surviving joint
tenant is deemed to have been acquired from the conveyance
which created the original transfer.22 The decedent's share ex-
pires and is therefore not subject to any will provision.23
There can be disadvantages to avoiding probate; certainty is
achieved at the expense of flexibility. The deceased joint tenant's
desires-for example, to pass the property to persons other than
the surviving joint tenant or to impose trust conditions (such as a
spendthrift or bypass trust) upon the surviving joint tenant-are
thwarted.
Creditors' Claims Against the Property
Joint tenancy property is not subject to the debts of a deceased
joint tenant. Of course, where a debt is owed by the survivor or
by both the deceased and the surviving joint tenant, it can be col-
lected from both halves of the former joint tenancy property.24
Alternatively, a spendthrift trust can achieve some25 protection
from creditors' claims in California. A predeceased spouse can
create a testamentary spendthrift trust for his or her half of the
community property for the surviving spouse. But a spendthrift
trust cannot be created for oneself.26 Property received under a
right of survivorship, therefore, is incapable of being used by the
a married couple is the main focus of this article, joint tenancies will be treated as
if there were only two joint tenants.
22. Hannon v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 12 Cal. App. 350, 355-56, 107 P. 335, 338
(1909) states:
By the well-established rules of the common law, upon the death of one
joint tenant, the title did not 'vest in the survivor.' The notion of the na-
ture of a joint tenancy entertained by the ancient law writers and jurists
was a very peculiar one. The title did not vest or descend upon the death
of one tenant. In contemplation of law each tenant was seised of the
whole estate from the first, and no change occurred in his title on the
death of his co-tenant. It simply 'remained' to him. He did not derive the
title or estate or any part or interest therein from his co-tenant, but wholly
from the original grant ....
It is therefore a mistake to say of joint tenants that the title vests in the
survivor upon the death of the co-tenant, or that it descends to him from
his co-tenant; for it had already vested in him by and at the time of, the
original grant.
23. Even though joint tenancy property cannot be directly devised or be-
queathed, a will can force an election by which the surviving joint tenant may
either retain the joint tenancy property or take under the will of the decedent in
exchange for surrendering rights in the former joint tenancy property. See Estate
of Kennedy, 135 Cal. App. 3d 676, 681, 185 Cal. Rptr. 540, 542 (1982).
24. Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 221, 126 P.2d 118, 120 (1942).
25. In California spendthrift trusts can partially, but not completely, protect
their assets from the claims of creditors of the beneficiary. CA-. Cirv. CODE §§ 726,
859, 867 (West 1982).
26. See Nelson v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal. 2d 501, 202 P.2d 1021 (1949).
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surviving joint tenant for a spendthirft trust for his or her own
benefit.
Advantages to Banks and Transfer Agents
Financial institutions prefer joint tenancy bank accounts
27 so
that the institution is free to surrender any portion or all of the
balance of the joint account or certificate upon the demand of
either depositor. If the funds are community property, a bank
might commit an error in disbursing funds to a spouse who does
not have management and control of those particular community
funds.
DIFFERING INCIDENTS
The incidents of joint tenancy and community property differ,
but are the incidents so antithetical that the best features of each
cannot be combined? The determination that property cannot be
held as both community and joint tenancy at the same time has
been traditionally justified28 by the mere statement that the inci-
dents of the two forms are not identical.
An examination of the two forms does reveal a number of
differences:
Joint Tenancy Incidents: "For the creation of a joint tenancy,
four unities are required, namely unity of interest, unity of title,
unity of time, unity of possession." 29 Each joint tenant possesses
a present, vested right of ownership, management, and control of
the property.30 Joint tenancy has the incidents of survivorship
3 l
27. Joint accounts are authorized for banks, savings and loan associations and
credit unions by statute. See, e.g., CAT_ FIN. CODE §§ 852, 7602, 7603, 7603.5, 7604,
11204, 11205, 11206.5, 14854 (West 1981). The provisions are more liberal than the
common law form of joint tenancy in that the funds of either person or both can
be deposited into such an account and withdrawals of the entire amount may be
made by either joint tenant unless the joint tenants instruct the financial institu-
tion to the contrary.
28. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
29. Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767, 771, 7 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1932) (quoting De
Witt v. San Francisco, 2 Cal. 289, 297 (1852)).
30. The joint tenants are holders of proportional fractional shares for the pur-
pose of alienation, but they are seised of the entire realty for the purpose of ten-
ure and survivorship, according to 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES *182 (1883).
Occasionally courts forget the distinction and refer to the ownership of joint ten-
ancy between husband and wife by stating that "each is the owner of an undivided
one-half interest therein in his [or her] separate right." Barba v. Barba, 103 Cal.
App. 2d 395, 396, 229 P.2d 465, 466 (1951). See also Miller v. Miller, 227 Cal. App. 2d
and destructibility by nongratuitous unilateral severance;32 these
two incidents have never been part of community property.
Community Property Incidents: Originally,33 the wife's interest
in community property in California was neither equal nor
vested. That historic community interest thus lacked the unities
of interest and possession between husband and wife; addition-
ally, the unity of title was not required for community property
because the title could be in the names of both husband and wife
or in the name of the husband alone.
Most of the differences between joint tenancy and California
historic community property have been eliminated. A list of ma-
jor changes in California's community property system shows the
increasing rights of the wife:
1891: Husband's previously unlimited right to give away
community property without the wife's consent was
curtailed.34
1917: Husband's prior ability to mortgage or convey for con-
sideration without the wife's signature was limited.35
1923: Wife was granted equal right to devise or bequeath
community property and given greater intestacy rights
322, 327, 38 Cal. Rptr. 571, 574 (1964); Squibb v. Squibb, 190 Cal. App. 2d 766, 769, 12
Cal. Rptr. 346, 348 (1961).
31. The survivorship feature of joint tenancy is steeped in a mysticism which
only a first-year law student is willing to believe. According to the ancient docu-
ments (and certainly not supported by logic), each of the joint tenants owns the
entire property, subject only to the rights of the other joint tenant(s). There is a
200% (or 300% if three joint tenants exist, etc.) ownership of the property until the
death of one joint tenant. Thus, the ancient dogma recites, the joint tenant ac-
quires nothing by the death of other joint tenant(s); the survivor owned it from
the time of the original conveyance. Of course, this is poppycock, but upon such
poppycock is the common law concept of joint tenancy founded.
32. In California, the married couple can agree bilaterally to change the char-
acter or form of the property from or into community property or joint tenancy. A
gratuitous unilateral transfer of one's half to the other owner is possible in either
joint tenancy or community property; the result is that the nonacting party owns
the entire property as his or her separate property. The term "non-gratuitous uni-
lateral severance" is used to indicate the ability of one owner, acting alone, to ter-
minate the form of co-ownership (joint tenancy or community property) and
retain ownership of one half of the property. The non-gratuitous unilateral sever-
ance can be a transfer of one half for consideration (which is a conversion of both
form and ownership) or a transfer to oneself (which is a conversion of ownership
only). It is a "cashing-out' from the joint or community form. See infra note 39.
33. In classic, but not California, community property systems, the spouses
did not have complete freedom to agree to transmute the character of property
from community to separate or vice versa. As late as 1970, Louisiana and Texas
still had substantial limitations upon the ability of spouses to change ownership
back and forth from community to separate. See R. MENNELL, supra note 2, at 21,
31, 32-33.
34. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125(b), 5127 (West Supp. 1982).
35. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1982). But see CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 5124 (West 1970).
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in husband's community share.
36
1927: Wife's interest in community property was declared to
be present, vested and equal.
37
1975: Wife was given approximately equal management and
control of community property.
38
These changes can be interpreted as modifications of California's
community property system toward the joint tenancy form.
The following table compares the incidents of historic and cur-




INCIDENT HISTORIC CURRENT JOINT TENANCY
Each owner entitled to:
Vested Right: NO YES YES
Possession: NO YES YES
Management and Control: NO YES YES
Non-gratuitous Severance: NO NO YES
39
Survivorship: NO NO YES
THE MAJOR CASES
Although a number of California cases have stated that commu-
36. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5124, 5127 (West Supp. 1982). See also CAL. PROB.
CODE § 201 (West 1956).
37. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1982).
38. See CAL CIV. CODE §§ 5125, 5127, 5127.5 (West Supp. 1982).
39. California has moved joint tenancy toward community property instead of
the other way around in dealing with the termination of joint tenancies by the de-
struction of one of the unities. At common law, any unilateral or bilateral convey-
ance or withdrawal of a joint tenant's aliquot portion of the property operated to
terminate the joint tenancy as to that person. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*1883. The California adaptation requires the intention of both joint tenants in or-
der to terminate the joint tenancy in many cases; otherwise, the proceeds of a
joint tenancy are also joint tenancy. See Fish v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 31 Cal.
2d 378, 189 P.2d 10 (1948). Tracing proceeds is a technique used by community
property law, but not done for joint tenancy at common law. One of the conse-
quences of this California doctrine is that property can be owned in joint tenancy
without an express statement that it is joint tenancy (thus avoiding the require-
ment of CAL CrV. CODE § 683 (West 1982) that it be "expressly declared in the ...
transfer to be a joint tenancy") because it is traced to property which was so ex-
pressly stated and which was changed in form without the intention to sever the
joint tenancy. See R. MENNELT., CALiFORNA DECEDENTS' ESTATES 8 n.2 (1973).
Note that regardless of which doctrine moved, this is further evidence of the trend
in California to blend the incidents of community property and joint tenancy.
nity property cannot simultaneously be held in joint tenancy,40
the three most significant are Estate of Gurnsey,41 Siberell v. Sibe-
re1142 and Tomaier v. Tomaier.
43
The leading case is Estate of Gurnsey; the court held that prop-
erty "passed out of the community" 44 when a joint tenancy bank
account deposit was made. In 1918 when Gurnsey was decided,
the wife did not have a present, vested, and equal interest in the
community property; the husband had full management and con-
trol. When the joint tenancy account was created, exclusive man-
agement and control passed from the husband, and the wife's
interest expanded from an expectancy 45 to vested ownership in
the property. In view of such differences in the incidents of title,
it is understandable that the Gurnsey court refused to permit co-
existence of community property and joint tenancy.
In Siberell v. Siberell, the most scholarly modern case to distin-
guish community property from joint tenancy, the court quoted
and followed Estate of Gurnsey. Siberell recited the gradual
growth of the wife's rights in community property from an expec-
tancy to a vested interest, but failed to consider those changes in
evaluating the doctrine that joint tenancy and community prop-
erty are mutually exclusive.46
In Tomaier v. Tomaier, Justice Traynor repeated the Siberell
rule that property held in joint tenancy cannot also be held as
community property because certain incidents of the former
would be inconsistent with the incidents of the latter.47 The
Tomaier case broke new ground, however, by reducing the degree
of formality necessary to rebut the presumption that property in
joint tenancy form was intended to be joint tenancy in fact.
Neither Siberell nor Tomaier considered the extent to which
the changes in the incidents of community property coincided
with the ownership interests in joint tenancy. Rather, in these
cases, the courts concerned themselves with other previously un-
resolved issues.48
40. See cases cited supra note 6.
41. 177 Cal 211, 170 P. 402 (1918); see also Estate of Harris, 169 Cal. 725, 147 P.
967 (1915); De Witt v. San Francisco, 2 Cal. 297 (1852).
42. 214 Cal. 767, 7 P.2d 1003 (1932).
43. 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944).
44. 177 Cal. 211, 213, 170 P. 402, 403 (1918).
45. Such expectancy is commonly called a "mere expectancy" to distinguish it
from a vested right.
46. 214 Cal. 767, 772, 7 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1932).
47. 23 Cal. 2d 754, 758, 146 P.2d 905, 907 (1944).
48. In Siberell the court was trying to avoid the unfortunate holding of Dunn v.
Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 296 P. 604 (1931), that property deeded to husband and wife
without explanation was presumed to vest a half-interest therein in the wife as
her separate estate and in the husband the remaining half as community property,
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The retention of the distinction between community property
and joint tenancy proved to be unwise. The Tomaier holding gave
rise to a large number of cases 49 and scholarly articles5 0 which
thereby creating a 75% ownership in the wife. This result was dictated by CAL.
Cirv. CODE § 164, a predecessor to CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1982), which
provides that property deeded to a married woman before 1975 is presumed to be
her separate property. In Tomaier, the court authorized the admission of parol ev-
idence to prove that the parties did not intend to create a joint tenancy by the ex-
press statement in writing that a joint tenancy was intended. 23 Cal. 2d 754, 757,
146 P.2d 905, 906.
49. The floodgate-opening by the Tomaier decision is evinced by many subse-
quent cases. See cases cited infra notes 51-53. See also the following appellate
cases which decided whether property held in joint tenancy form was really com-
munity property:
(i) Divorce cases: Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 853 (1980); LaMar v. LaMar, 30 Cal. 2d 898, 186 P.2d 678 (1947); Dick-
son v. Dickson, 225 Cal. App. 2d 752, 37 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1964); Isom v.
Slaughter, 200 Cal. App. 2d 700, 19 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1962); McChesney v.
McChesney, 182 Cal. App. 2d 268, 5 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1960); Palazuelos v.
Palazuelos, 103 Cal. App. 2d 826, 230 P.2d 431 (1951); Perdicalis v. Perdi-
calls, 92 Cal. App. 2d 274, 206 P.2d 650 (1949); Cairo v. Cairo, 87 Cal. App. 2d
558, 197 P.2d 208 (1948); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 83 Cal. App. 2d 71, 187 P.2d
840 (1947); Wood v. Wood, 81 Cal. App. 2d 727, 185 P.2d 53 (1947); Silver-
stein v. Silverstein, 76 Cal. App. 2d 872, 174 P.2d 486 (1946);
(ii) Death cases (usually these suits arise between the surviving joint
tenant and the executor of a will attempting to dispose of the property):
Socol v. King, 36 Cal. 2d 342, 223 P.2d 627 (1950); Thompson v. Boyd, 217
Cal. App. 2d 365, 32 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1963); Lich v. Carlin, 184 Cal. App. 2d
128, 7 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1960); Edwards v. Deitrich, 118 Cal. App. 2d 254, 257
P.2d 750 (1953); Mademann v. Sexauer, 117 Cal. App. 2d 400, 256 P.2d 34
(1953); Estate of Jameson, 93 Cal. App. 2d 35, 208 P.2d 54 (1949); Silver v.
Shemanski, 89 Cal. App. 2d 520, 201 P.2d 418 (1949); Hausfelder v. Security-
First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. App. 2d 478, 176 P.2d 84 (1946);
Horsman v. Maden, 69 Cal. App. 2d 11, 157 P.2d 882 (1945); Estate of Wil-
son, 64 Cal. App. 2d 123, 148 P.2d 390 (1944);
(ill) Miscellaneous cases: United States v. Pierotti, 154 F.2d 758 (9th Cir.
1946) (estate tax); Bordenave v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal.
1957) (income tax basis); Schoenfeld v. Norberg, 11 Cal. App. 3d 755, 90
Cal. Rptr. 47 (1970) (enforcement of judgment); Lovetro v. Steers, 234 Cal.
App. 2d 461, 44 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1965) (management and control; signature of
both joint tenants required in order to release portion of promissory note);
Turknette v. Turknette, 100 Cal. App. 2d 271, 223 P.2d 495 (1950) (putative
spouse cases decided by analogy to divorce situation).
50. See articles cited supra notes 9 and 15, and infra note 69. See also Basye,
Joint Tenancy: A Reappraisal, 30 CAL, ST. B.J. 504 (1950); Brown & Sherman, Joint
Tenancy or Community Property: Evidence, 28 CAL. ST. B.J. 163 (1953); Effland,
Arizona Community Property Law: Time for Review and Revision, 1982 ARuz. ST.
L.J. 1, 11-14 (1982); Ferrari, Conversion of Community Property into Joint Tenancy
Property in California: The Taxpayer's Position, 2 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 61
(1962); Knutson, California Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative
Study and Reform, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 240, 252 (1966); Lyman, Oral Conversion of
Property by Husband and Wife from Joint Tenancy to Community Property, 23
CAL ST. B.J. 146 (1948); Miller, Joint Tenancy as Related to Community Property,
19 CAL. ST. B.J. 61 (1944); Mills, Community Joint Tenancy-A Paradoxical Prob-
elaborated the rules for establishing that property held in joint
tenancy form of title was really community property. In many
cases, the testimony as to the character of title was suspicious51
and vague.52 The undesirable flood of litigation abated only after
two major changes in the law. First, special legislation was en-
acted which set forth a presumption that a single-family resi-
dence acquired during marriage as joint tenants is community
property for the purposes of dissolution of marriage or legal sepa-
ration only.5 3 Second, the divorce laws5 4 eliminated the concept
of fault and the distinction between grounds as to whether an
equal or unequal division of the community property is required.
The Tomaier case and its progeny suggest that abuses do occur
lem in Estate Administration, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 38 (1974); Reppy, Debt Collection
from Married Californians: Problems Caused by Transmutations, Single-Spouse
Management and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 143 (1980); Comm. on
Death Taxation of Estates and Trusts, Property Owned with Spouse: Joint Ten-
ancy, Tenancy by the Entireties and Community Property, 11 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TRUST J. 405, 426-31 (1976); Note, Community Property: Admissibility of Evidence
ofAgreement that Property Invested in Joint Tenancy in California or in Non-com-
munity Property State Retain Community Character, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 182 (1944);
Comment, Community Property-Joint Tenancy---Admissibility of Parol Evidence
to Show Community Character of Property Deeded to Husband and Wife as Joint
Tenants, 17 S. CAL. L. REV. 401 (1944).
51. See, e.g., Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal. 2d 131, 163 P.2d 443 (1945), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 843 (1946); Gloden v. Gloden, 240 Cal. App. 2d 465, 49 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1966); Opp
v. Frye, 70 Cal. App. 2d 478, 161 P.2d 235 (1945).
52. See, e.g., Mears v. Mears, 180 Cal. App. 2d 484, 4 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1960);
Schindler v. Schindler, 126 Cal. App. 2d 597, 272 P.2d 566 (1954); Walker v. Walker,
108 Cal. App. 2d 605, 239 P.2d 106 (1952); Nelson v. Nelson, 100 Cal. App. 2d 348, 223
P.2d 636 (1950); Luminoso v. Luminoso, 75 Cal. App. 2d 472, 171 P.2d 516 (1946).
53. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1982). The statute would not have elim-
inated the need for litigation in the following cases as the realty involved was
other than a single-family residence: Beck v. Beck, 242 Cal. App. 2d 396, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 491 (1966); Blankenship v. Blankenship, 212 Cal. App. 2d 736, 28 Cal. Rptr. 176
(1963); Borgerding v. Mumolo, 153 Cal. App. 2d 821, 315 P.2d 347 (1957); Tisch-
hauser v. Tischhauser, 142 Cal. App. 2d 252, 298 P.2d 551 (1956); Rogers v. Rogers,
86 Cal. App. 2d 817, 195 P.2d 890 (1948); Andrews v. Andrews, 82 Cal. App. 2d 521,
186 P.2d 744 (1947); Waters v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946); Hu-
ber v. Huber, 27 Cal. 2d 784, 167 P.2d 708 (1946).
54. Until the adoption of no-fault divorce in 1970, community property was di-
vided equally if the divorce was granted for any of four of the seven statutory
grounds. If, however, the divorce was granted to one of the parties for any of the
other three grounds of divorce (adultery, incurable insanity or the most popular
ground, extreme cruelty) the divorce court was authorized to divide community
property unequally "in such proportions... as the court... may deem just;" that
is, the spouse who was not "at fault" could be awarded a larger share of the com-
munity property. Former CAL. CrV. CODE § 146 (West 1954), repealed by 1969 CAL.
STAT. 1608, § 3. The courts were not authorized, however, to divide joint tenancy
property unequally or to award the separate property (as joint tenancy was held
to be) of one spouse to the other. See Robinson v. Robinson, 65 Cal. App. 2d 118,
150 P.2d 7 (1944). Therefore, it was advantageous for the plaintiff to allege a
ground for divorce authorizing an unequal division of the community and to allege
further that property held in joint tenancy form had been intended to be, and was,
community property.
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and special problems of proof have been created. It is desirable
to minimize the differences between joint tenancy and commu-
nity property in California to reduce the incentive to create false
evidence (or suppress true evidence) of either the transmutation
of joint tenancy to community property, or the severance of joint
tenancy.
How CASE LAW CouLD BE CHANGED
The differences between joint tenancy and community property
will be reduced if community property is allowed to possess the
incident of the right of survivorship for which joint tenancy is cov-
eted. Two possible judicial routes are available. First, the courts
could reverse the Gurnsey, Siberell and Tomaier rule that com-
munity property cannot be held as joint tenancy. Second, the
courts could permit the addition of the incident of survivorship to
community property.
The rule that the same property cannot be community property
and joint tenancy at the same time should be reversed. The court
should permit property to be held simultaneously as joint tenancy
and community property, retaining the right of survivorship (and
its non-gratuitous unilateral termination) but otherwise consider-
ing the property to be community property for the purposes of
dissolution or divorce and claims by creditors during the lifetime
of the joint tenants.
Reversal of the Gurnsey, Siberell and Tomaier line of cases is
appropriate because the changes from historic community prop-
erty law which now make the co-owners equal have eliminated
the major differences between the two forms. Reversal would:
conform the law to the expectations of laypersons about a popular
form of ownership, reduce the incentive for presentation of ques-
tionable evidence, and simplify probate and marriage dissolu-
tion 55 hearings.
55. The Second District Court of Appeal commented in Schindler v. Schindler,
126 Cal. App. 2d 597, 601, 272 P.2d 566, 568 (1954):
Usually not until marital discord reaches the critical stage of dividing com-
munity assets does one of the spouses-generally the one found to be in-
nocent of wrong-doing and therefore entitled to more than half of the
community property-first learn of the disadvantages of joint tenancy. At
that point the issue of lack of comprehension, or absence of consent to the
creation of the joint tenancy estate inevitably arises. Rare indeed is the
contested divorce case today in which the trial court is not concerned with
this issue.
Reversal of those cases would not disrupt reasonable expecta-
tions. The effect would be to allow joint tenancy property to be
treated as community property. It would not have the effect of
adding a right of survivorship to existing community property
which is not in joint tenancy form because an express statement
in the transfer is required in order to create a joint tenancy.
5 6
Community ownership of property is terminated either during
life (which termination is usually a dissolution of the marriage)
or at death. Problems are created by the desire of laypersons to
combine the features of community property during life and joint
tenancy at the moment of death, while courts insist that only one
form will be permitted. Nevertheless, the combination has been
partially authorized for divorce and separation cases. California
presumes that a single-family residence acquired during marriage
as joint tenants is community property for the purpose of dissolu-
tion.57 The combination of features is thus authorized by statute
for dissolution (by which joint tenancy is treated as community),
but not for death (in which community property would be treated
as joint tenancy).
RIGHT OF SURVIVORSIIP SEPARATE FROM JOINT TENANCY
Can a right of survivorship exist in California without the prop-
erty being held in joint tenancy? The right of survivorship is
found in tenancies by the entirety and in United States bonds.
However, the common law tenancy by the entirety does not exist
in California.58 United States savings bonds registered in two
names joined by "or" also create a right of survivorship under fed-
eral regulations and Free v. Bland,59 as well as California Civil
Code section 704. But, aside from that section (which could be a
reflection of prevailing federal law), there is serious question
whether a separate right of survivorship has been or will be rec-
ognized in California.
Legislation has suggested 6O that there may have been a sepa-
56. CAL. Crv. CODE § 683 (West Supp. 1982).
57. CAL. CiV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp. 1982).
58. See Swan v. Walden, 156 Cal. 195, 198, 103 P. 931, 932 (1909); Delanoy v. De-
lanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 26, 13 P.2d 513, 514 (1932); Tischhauser v. Tischhauser, 142 Cal.
App. 2d 252, 256, 298 P.2d 551, 554 (1956).
59. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
60. Griffith theorized in Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN.
L. REV. 87, 102 (1961), that the legislature accepted the propositon that community
property could also be held in joint tenancy form because of an amendment to for-
mer CAL. PROB. CODE § 228 (West 1956) (as amended by 1939 CAL. STAT. 1065, § 1),
dealing with the intestate distribution of a widow's or widower's property held as
community property at the death of the predeceased spouse. That section, re-
pealed by 1980 CAL STAT. 136, stated that: "if... the estate... was community
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rate right of survivorship at various times for bank accounts 6 1 and
the civil homestead.62 However, Fingland's EstateO and Schuler
v. Savings & Loan Soc. ,64 held that the declaration of a right of
survivorship creates a joint tenancy in the civil homestead; and
McDougald v. Boyd 65 and Hurley v. Hibernia Savings & Loan,6 6
held that bank deposits payable to the survivor of two or more de-
positors were joint tenancy property. The tradition of those
cases67 suggests that a right of survivorship separate from a joint
tenancy is unlikely to be recognized by California courts.
It is wise jurisprudence to declare the right of survivorship to
be an indispensable element of a joint tenancy. This avoids the
necessity of stating "joint tenancy with right of survivorship" in
California to distinguish a joint tenancy from other forms of com-
mon ownership, such as a tenancy in common. The term "joint
tenancy" should imply a right of survivorship, and an attempt to
create a joint tenancy without the right of survivorship should
property of the decedent and a previously deceased spouse, and ...became
vested in the decedent... by right of survivorship ... in a joint tenancy between
such spouse and the decedent ... such property goes ... to the children of the
deceased spouse. . . ." Griffith argued that "otherwise the emphasized material is
superfluous since section 228 [then dealt] with separate property in joint tenancy
form that comes to the survivor by right of survivorship." Griffith, supra, at 102.
A similar argument could be made regarding Ci'_ PROB. CODE § 229(b) (3) (West
Supp. 1982), which defines "portion of the decedent's estate attributable to the de-
cedent's predeceased spouse" to include "[tlhat portion of any community prop-
erty in which the predeceased spouse had any incident of ownership and which
vested in the decedent upon the death of the predeceased spouse by right of survi-
vorship." Two interpretations are possible of the word "had" in CAT_ PROB. CODE
§ 229(b) (3): "ever during the marriage had" or "had at the moment of his or her
death." If the latter interpretation is used, the legislature can fairly be said to
have recognized the possibility of the co-existence of community property and
joint tenancy ownership. The argument is punctured, however, by comparing the
result of Estate of Kessler, 217 Cal. 32, 17 P.2d 117 (1932), with Estate of Taitmeyer,
60 Cal. App. 2d 699, 141 P.2d 504 (1943) and Estate of Nielsen, 65 Cal. App. 2d 60, 149
P.2d 737 (1944). In Kessler, the Court accepted the "at the moment of his or her
death" interpretation; the Taitmeyer and Nielsen courts accepted the "ever during
the marriage" interpretation.
61. 1909 CAL. STAT. 76, § 16.
62. Former CAL Crv. CODE § 1265, deleted by 1980 CAL_ STAT. c. 119.
63. 129 Cal. App. 395, 397, 18 P.2d 747, 748 (1933).
64. 64 Cal. 397, 1 P. 480 (1883).
65. 157 Cal. 753, 159 P. 168 (1916).
66. 126 Cal. App. 314, 14 P.2d 574 (1932).
67. California law apears to diverge from common law in finding the right of
survivorship and joint tenancy inseparable; generally an attempt to destroy the
right of survivorship destroys a joint tenancy. See infra note 68. But see cases
cited supra notes 63-66 (attempt to create a right of survivorship creates a joint
tenancy).
fail.68 The converse, however, is not necessarily true. If one can-
not have a joint tenancy without a survivorship, it does not neces-
sarily follow that one cannot have a right of survivorship without
the property being held in joint tenancy.
Reversal of an established line of cases or institution of a new
doctrine of separability of the right of survivorship is unlikely.
The remedy, therefore, appears to lie with the California legisla-
ture rather than the courts. Such legislation needs to be explicit
in its intention to avoid the interpretation that it intends to create
a joint tenancy.
EXISTING SuIvvoRsHIP RIGHTS IN CAInFoRNIA
The right of survivorship does not offend public policy. There is
nothing inherently wrong with avoiding probate. The same effect
as a right of survivorship can be obtained by drafting legal or eq-
uitable joint life estates with alternate contingent remainders to
the survivors upon each death. The same disposition (but not
avoidance of the first probate) could be obtained by reciprocal
contracts to devise and bequeath the property between two or
more tenants in common.
The question is not whether probate should be avoidable by a
right of survivorship, but whether a right of survivorship should
be readily and easily available without the need for professional
assistance. The argument has been made69 that because the con-
sequences of joint tenancy are not understood by laypersons,
joint tenancy should be abolished. The same argument could be
made for community property, motor vehicle registration and a
vast number of legal relationships. The intention of that author
was not to eliminate joint tenancies, but to insist that their crea-
tion be supervised by attorneys. Disregarding possible allega-
tions of self-serving interests, other difficulties arise. The concept
that only lawyer-supervised transactions affecting the disposition
of property at death should be permitted is somewhat similar to
control of certain medial preparations by requiring a doctor's pre-
scription and a pharmacist's preparation. Without the doctor's
prescription, the patient is deprived of the use of the medicine.
Part of the justification for the prescription requirement is that
the doctor can tailor the prescription to the patient's particular
needs. Similarly, the lawyer can tailor joint tenancies to the ap-
propriate cases. Unfortunately, the expense of both doctor and
lawyer further limits the availability and utilization of their serv-
68. See McDonald v. Morley, 15 Cal. 2d 409, 101 P.2d 690 (1940).
69. See Nossaman, The Joint Tenancy Problem, 27 CAT_ ST. B.J. 21, 25 (1952).
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ices. Stricter requirements for creation limit access. Although
this paper points out disadvantages of joint tenancy,7 0 the author
believes that there are not sufficient dangers in joint tenancy to
warrant restricting access. The California legislature seems to
agree, based upon the number of statutes which authorize joint
tenancy forms of title.
California has two types of statutory provisions which authorize
titles in joint tenancy-general provisions and provisions dealing
with specific types of assets. The general provisions are Civil
Code sections 682 and 5104.71 The special provisions authorize
joint tenancy forms of title for such varied assets as United States
savings bonds or other bonds or obligations of the United
States,72 bank accounts,7 3 savings and loan association accounts,
74
mutual savings and loan association accounts,
7 5 credit unions,7 6
mobile homes 77 and motor vehicles.78 In addition, other code sec-
tionS7 9 protect transfer agents 8O and financial institutions,8 1 which
rely upon the joint tenancy form of title to transfer property or
funds to a surviving joint tenant.
The general statutory provisions8 2 appear to lend grammatical
support to the established rule that property cannot be both joint
tenancy and community property. Civil Code section 5104 states
that "[a] husband and wife may hold property as joint tenants,
tenants in common, or as community property."83 Civil Code sec-
tion 682 states that "[t]he ownership of property by several per-
sons is either:
1. Of joint interests;
2. Of partnership interests;
3. Of interests in common;
70. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
71. CAI- CIV. CODE § 682 (West Supp. 1982); CAL Crv. CODE § 5104 (West 1970).
72. CAL. Crv. CODE § 704 (West 1982).
73. CAL FiN. CODE § 852 (West 1968).
74. CAL. FIN. CODE § 7602 (West 1968).
75. CAL FiN. CODE § 11204 (West 1981).
76. CAL FIN. CODE § 14854 (West 1981).
77. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18080 (West Supp. 1982).
78. CAL VEH. CODE §§ 4150.5, 5600.5, 39045 (West 1971).
79. CAL CoRP. CODE § 420 (West Supp. 1982); CAL FIN. CODE §§ 852, 7603,
(West 1968); CAL FIN. CODE §§ 11204, 14854 (West 1981).
80. CAL Com. CODE § 420 (West Supp. 1982).
81. CAL FIN. CODE §§ 852, 7603 (West 1968); CAL FIN. CODE §§ 11204, 14854
(West 1981).
82. See supra note 71.
83. CAL. CiM. CODE § 5104 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
4. Of community interest of husband and wife."84
The use of the language suggesting alternatives ("or", "either")
seems to indicate that property cannot be both joint tenancy and
community property. But there are two other areas where dupli-
cation of the sub-parts of Civil Code sections 682 and 5104 exists:
a tenancy in common may be either community or separate prop-
erty;8 5 and a partnership interest, as opposed to an interest in
specific partnership assets, can be community property.86 The
statutory language does not mandate that community property
never can possess the incident of the right of survivorship.
Even when the statute appears to be mandatory, there are ex-
ceptions. Civil Code section 683 requires an express intention to
create a joint tenancy; but multiple fiduciaries hold title as joint
tenants 87 unless an express provision to the contrary is made.
There are also certain statutes which create what is, in effect, a
right of survivorship without necessarily creating a joint tenancy.
Powers of appointment vested in several persons may be exe-
cuted by the surviving competent donees of the power.88 On the
death of a partner, his or her right in specific partnership property
vests in the surviving partners.89
ExISTING SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTs OUTSIDE CALIFORIA
The right of survivorship can be attached to many forms of
holding title. Nevada permits attachment of a right of survivor-
ship to community property.90 All of the community property
states except Louisiana attach a right of survivorship to joint ten-
ancy property.91 Washington permits a community property
agreement which not only allows a right of survivorship, but also
permits disposition of the property to a third person.92 Idaho ad-
vances the Washington model still further by permitting separate
property as well as community to be subject to the agreement.9 3
The proposed Uniform Marital Property Act "Discussion Draft,"
Section 16, provides for "Survivorship Marital Property" which is
84. CAL. CrV. CODE § 682 (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
85. See Comment, supra note 15, at 636 n.2.
86. CA. CORP. CODE § 15025(e) (West 1977).
87. CA. Crv. CODE § 2288 (West 1954). See also Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust
Co., 27 Cal. 2d 457, 165 P.2d 15 (1946); Drinkhouse v. Birch Ranch & Oil Co., 97 Cal.
App. 2d 923, 219 P.2d 45 (1950).
88. CAL CrV. CODE § 860 (West 1982).
89. CAL. CORP,. CODE § 15025 (2) (d) (West 1977).
90. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 1, 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
93. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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conceded to be a "novel idea."9 4
Each of these statutes should be examined for the manner in
which legitimate public policy concerns are addressed or ignored.
Among such concerns are the formality and precision necessary
to create, amend, and revoke the arrangement; the coverage (sub-
sequently-acquired property, proceeds, rents, issues or profits,
etc.) of the statute; and protection of creditors. The following de-
tailed examination of the statutes shows that adequate drafting
models exist for the California legislature to create a permissive
right of survivorship as an incident to community ownership of
property.
Nevada
Legislation in Nevada shows the ease with which a right of sur-
vivorship can be attached to community property:
Nevada Revised Statutes section 111.064(2) provides:
A right of survivorship does not arise when an estate in community
property is created in a husband and wife, as such, unless the instrument
creating the estate expressly declares that the husband and wife take the
property as community property with a right of survivorship. This right of
survivorship is extinguished whenever either spouse, during the marriage,
transfers his interest in the community property.
95
Some questions are not answered by Nevada Revised Statutes
section 111.064(2). For example, since the statute deals only with
creation of the right of survivorship at the time of the creation of
the interest in the property, can a right of survivorship be created
by deeding property out and back?96 Questions also arise as to
what exact words are necessary to create a right of survivorship.
Will the terms "or survivor" or "the survivor of" be sufficient?
The level of formality required is that of the statute of frauds,
that is, "a writing" which is more than the oral conversation suffi-
cient for a transmutation of the character of the property97 and
94. UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY AcT 30-32 (Discussion Draft 1982).
95. Nsv. REV. STAT. §§ 111.064(2) (1981) (emphasis added).
96. There appears to be very little risk of adverse property tax consequences
in California from deeding out property between spouses in order to create the
right of survivorship. Interspousal deeds are not a "change of ownership ... after
the 1975 assessment" within the meaning of CAr.. CONsT. art. )QUA, § 2. See also
CAT. REV. & TAx. CODE § 63 (West Supp. 1982).
97. Although oral transmutations of the character of property from community
to separate or vice versa were known in California before the decision in Tomaier
v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944), that case established the principle
that oral testimony would be allowed to vary the written form required for joint
less than that necessary to record a deed. The still more formal
requirements of the statute of wills could have been required on
the theory that the right of survivorship has consequences similar
to a will.
The Nevada statute deals only with property which is, or could
be, acquired by an instrument in writing. Does the right of survi-
vorship attach to the rents, issues, or profits or to the proceeds of
a sale of such property?
98
Most of the major assets of a family are acquired by a written
instrument. What of those items for which the documentation is
simply a receipt for the puchase price, such as furniture, jewelry,
cash, and collections of items such as stamps, coins, and rifles?
What type of transfer of the community property will terminate
the right of survivorship? Will a unilateral transfer be sufficient?
If so, there may be an extension of some of the questionable prac-
tices involved in terminating joint tenancies. Should involuntary
transfers terminate the right of survivorship? If a creditor of a dy-
ing spouse attaches the property, what interest does the surviving
spouse have in the property? Would an assignment or pledge by
one of the spouses terminate the right of survivorship?9 9
Another concern not answered by the Nevada statute is the pro-
tection of creditors. Although a creditor secured by joint tenancy
property could properly be required to obtain the signature of
both debtors, a creditor of community property might have dealt
with only one of the spouses (who, naturally, is the first to die)
and is therefore not be protected by the promise of the survivor
spouse to pay.
Washington
Washington has the oldest and most complete statute permit-
ting community property to have a right of survivorship. Revised
Code of Washingtion section 26.16.120100 permits spouses to cre-
tenancy. The converse situation, oral transmutation from community property to
joint tenancy, is not possible because of the requirement of a writing in order to
establish a joint tenancy imposed by CAL. Crv. CODE § 683 (West Supp. 1982).
98. In California, the proceeds of joint tenancy property, in the absence of con-
trary agreement, retain the character of the property from which they were ac-
quired. See Fish v. Security-First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. 2d 378, 387, 189
P.2d 10, 15 (1948); Estate of Kessler, 217 Cal. 32, 35, 17 P.2d 117, 118 (1932). It is
probable that a parallel rule will be instituted for non-joint tenancy property.
99. CAL. FIN. CODE § 7603.5, (West 1968) and CAl. FiN. CODE § 11206.5 (West
1981), provide that no assignment or pledge to a savings and loan association by
less than all of the survivors of the joint tenants shall operate to sever or termi-
nate, either in whole or in part, the continuance of the joint tenancy, subject to the
effect of such pledge or assignment.
100. WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.16.120 (1979) provides in part-
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ate, alter, and amend community property agreements with the
formality required for deeds of realty. An agreement may affect
all or part of present or future community property and may di-
rect the disposition of the property after the death of either
spouse. The rights of creditors are expressly protected.
The Washington statute is perhaps the best model by which the
California legislature could respond to the desires of California
couples to own community property with the right of
survivorship.
Idaho
Idaho Code section 15-6-2011 modifies an otherwise-uniform
Nothing... in any law of this state, shall prevent the husband and wife
from jointly entering into any agreement concerning the status or disposi-
tion of the whole or any portion of the community property, then owned
by them or afterwards to be acquired, to take effect upon the death of
either. But such agreement may be made at any time by the husband and
wife by the execution of an instrument in writing under their hands and
seals, and to be witnessed, acknowledged and certified in the same man-
ner as deeds to real estate are required to be, under the laws of the state,
and the same may at any time thereafter be altered or amended in the
same manner- Provided, however, that such agreement shall not derogate
from the right of creditors, nor be construed to curtail the powers of the
superior court to set aside or cancel such agreement for fraud or under
some other recognized head of equity jurisdiction, at the suit of either
party.
For a thorough analysis of this code section see Cross, The Community Property
Law in Washington, 49 WASH. I REV. 729, 798-802 (1974).
101. IDHo CODE § 15-6-201 (1979) provides:
(a) Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy, contract of
employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, deposit agreement, pen-
sion plan, trust agreement, conveyance, agreement to pass property at
death to the surviving spouse or any other written instrument effective as
a contract, gift, conveyance, or trust is deemed to be nontestamentary, and
this code does not invalidate the instrument or any provision:
(1) that money or other benefits theretofore due to, controlled or
owned by a decedent shall be paid after his death to a person designated
by the decedent in either the instrument or a separate writing, including a
will, executed at the same time as the instrument or subsequently;...
(2) that any property which is the subject of the instrument shall pass
to a person designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a sepa-
rate writing, including a will, executed at the same time as the instrument
or subsequently.
(b) Nothing in this section limits the rights of creditors under other
laws of this state.
(c) In the case of agreements to pass property at death to the surviv-
ing spouse, such agreements shall be executed in writing, acknowledged
or proved in the same manner as deeds to real property, contain a descrip-
tion of all real property, be altered or amended in the same way, and shall
be revoked in the event husband and wife are subsequently divorced. The
existence of such an agreement shall not affect the rights of creditors and
Uniform Probate Code by adding material (similar to the Wash-
ington provisions) permitting a community property agreement
which controls the passage of the property upon the death of
either spouse. Idaho requires that the agreement be recorded.102




The right of survivorship is a desired incident of various forms
of holding title, including joint tenancy. California cases unneces-
sarily concluded that community property cannot simultaneously
be joint tenancy. These cases do not, however, preclude the crea-
tion of a voluntary addition to the community ownership of the
right of survivorship. Additionally, the cases are based upon for-
mer differences between community property and joint tenancy.
The Idaho, Nevada, and Washington examples demonstrate that
the voluntary addition of the right of survivorship to community
property can be achieved. California should respond to the legiti-
mate needs of its citizens by permitting the addition of an op-
tional right of survivorship to community property.
any debt, cause of action or any obligation which could have been
presented as a claim against the property of the decedent's estate shall
survive against the other parties to the agreement; statutes of limitations
on any such debts, causes of action, choses in action, or other legal obliga-
tions shall continue to run as though the deceased person had survived
and any action brought against the persons succeeding to such property
shall be brought within the period limited for the commencement of such
action, provided that recovery against the person succeeding to such prop-
erty shall be limited to the fair market value of the property at the time of
the death of the decedent.
(d) No such agreement shall be effective to pass title to property until
it has been recorded, prior to the death of any party thereto, in the re-
corder's office of the county of the domicile of the decedent and of each
county in which real property described therein is located; nor shall any
amendment to any such agreement be effective for any purpose until such
amendment has been recorded in like manner prior to the death of any
party thereto.
102. IDAHO CODE § 15-6-201(d) (1979).
103. IDAHO CODE § 15-6-201(c) (1979).
